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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
After a jury trial, Crystal Lee Gabel was found guilty of one count of possession 
of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. 
On appeal, Ms. Gabel contends that the State engaged in two instances of 
misconduct during her second trial, which both occurred during closing statements. The 
prosecutor erroneously informed the jury as to one of the elements of the charge, and 
improperly offered her own opinion on Ms. Gabel's veracity. Although the prosecutorial 
misconduct was not objected to, Ms. Gabel asserts that it amounted to fundamental 
error and therefore can be considered on appeal. The misconduct violated Ms. Gabel's 
right to a fair trial and due process. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
In the early morning hours of August 16, 2012, Officer Santino Yago saw 
someone throw a cigarette butt out of the passenger side of a minivan. (12/10/13 Trial 
Tr., p.21, L.19 - p.22, L.4.) Officer Yago pulled the driver over, and asked the driver for 
permission to search the vehicle. (12/10/13 Trial Tr., p.22, Ls.2-7, p.25, Ls.15-19.) The 
driver agreed to the search, and each of the three passengers exited the van, one by 
one. (12/10/13 Trial Tr., p.24, L.14 - p.25, L.8, p.25, Ls.18-21.) Ms. Gabel, one of the 
passengers, was the fourth and final person to exit the van, and after she exited, Officer 
Yago noticed a small plastic baggie containing a crystal substance which later tested 
positive for methamphetamine. (12/10/13 Trial Tr., p.25, Ls.1-9, p.26, Ls.5-13, p.27, 
Ls.2-6, p.41, Ls.4-10.) Officer Yago questioned the occupants of the vehicle, focusing 
his efforts on Ms. Gabel, as she had been sitting in the location where the 
methamphetamine was found. (12/10/13 Trial Tr., p.26, Ls.5-8, p.32, L.11 - p.33, L.15.) 
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Ms. Gabel told two different stories about how and when she came to be holding the 
methamphetamine. (12/10/13 Trial Tr., p.32, L.17 - p.33, L.2, p.33, Ls.16-23, p.35, 
Ls.6-23.) After being told by Officer Yago that her boyfriend, passenger Richard Bower, 
had told Officer Yago that he had given it to Ms. Gabel to hold, Ms. Gabel admitted that 
this was true. (12/10/13 Trial Tr., p.32, L.17 - p.33, L.2.) When she savv ~Jlr. Bower 
being detained for possessing the controiled substance, Ms. Gabel changed her story 
and told the officer that she got the baggie from some girls at a party. (12/10/13 Trial 
Tr., p.34, L.14 - p.35, L.32.) Ms. Gabel also told Officer Yago that she had last used 
methamphetamine four hours earlier. (12/10/13 Trial Tr., p.34, Ls.5-13.) 
Based en these facts, Ms. Gabel was charged by Information with one count of 
felony possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. (R, pp.24-25.) 
Ms. Gabel exercised her constitutional right to a jury trial. The first trial resulted in a 
hung jury. (11/13/13 Trial Tr., p.34, L.14 - p.35, L.3.) The second time the case was 
tried, the prosecutor erroneously told the jury during her closing statement that it had to 
decide two issues, one of which was whether Ms. Gabel "knew or should have known 
that what was in that baggie was methamphetarnine." (12/11/13 Trial Tr., p.24, Ls.11-
14 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor also inserted her own opinion when she 
commented on Ms. Gabel's veracity during her closing remarks. (12/11/13 Trial 
Tr., p.25, L.22 - p.26, L.2, p.27, Ls.15-21.) The jury in the second trial ultimately found 
Ms. Gabel guilty as charged. (12/11/13 Trial Tr., p.45, Ls.7-15.) 
On February 25, 2014, the district court sentenced Ms. Gabel to three years, 
with one and a half years fixed, and suspended the sentence and placed Ms. Gabel on 
probation for three years. (R., pp.115-117.) The district court entered a written 
Judgment of Conviction on March 11, 2014. (R., pp.120-122.) 
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Did the State engage in one or more instances of misconduct, such that Ms. Gabel is 
entitled to a new trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct Necessitating A New Trial 
Ms. Gabel asserts that her right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Sixth and the 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution, was violated when the prosecutor: (1) misrepresented the law 
during closing arguments; and (2) offered her own opinion on Ms. Gabel's purported 
untruthfulness and her guilt/innocence. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[e]very person accused of crime in 
Idaho has the right to a fair and impartial trial." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 504 
Cl 980). Further, the prosecutor has an independent duty to the defendant with regard to 
his or her right to a fair trial. In the words of the Court: 
We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant 
has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to 
the jury." They should not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far 
they can trespass upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing 
they transgress upon the rights of the accused." 
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 
Ms. Gabel asserts that the prosecutor's misconduct usurped the jury's factfinding 
role, lowered the State's burden of proof, and amounted to fundamental error, and, 
therefore this Court should vacate her conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance. 
A. The Prosecutor Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct In Closing Arguments By 
Misstating The Law 
Ms. Gabel asserts that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during 
her closing argument by misstating the law. The misstatement of the law ultimately 
reduced the State's burden of proof, allowing the jury to convict Ms. Gabel using a 
negligence standard. 
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Ms. Gabel was charged with possession of a controlled substance under 
LC.§ 37-2732(c)(1) which provides, in relevant part: 
(c) It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless 
the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid 
prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter. 
(1) Any person who violates this subsection and has in his possession a 
controlled substance classified in schedule I which is a narcotic drug or a 
controlled substance classified in schedule II, is guilty of a fe!ony and upon 
conviction may be imprisoned for not more than seven (7) years, or fined 
not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or both. 
1.C. § 37-2732(c)(1 ). 
Possession of a controlled substance is a general intent crime requiring that the 
defendant knowingly possess the substance. State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 704 
(Ct. App. 2005); State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240 (1999); State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 
926 ( 1993 ). The Idaho Court of Appeals in Stefani noted that, "[t)he purpose of the 
intent element in the definition of a possession offense is to separate innocent, 
accidental, or inadvertent conduct from criminal behavior."1 Stefani, 142 Idaho at 704. 
Here, the State charged Ms. Gabel with possessing methamphetamine in 
violation of Idaho Code Section 37-2732(c)(1 ). (R., pp.24-25.) The general elements 
jury instruction provides that "[i]n order for the defendant to be guilty of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, the state must prove each of the following: ... the defendant 
either knew it was methamphetamine or believed it was a controlled substance." (Jury 
Instruction No. 11, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on December 19, 2014.) 
Therefore, it was the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Gabel 
knew it was methamphetamine or believed it was a controlled substance. Under this 
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instruction, the jury could not convict if she did not know it was meth or some other 
controlled substance-even if the jurors believed she should have know it was meth or 
some other controlled substance. 
Nonetheless, the prosecutor began her closing statement to the jury by saying: 
Ladies and gentlemen, I would submit to you that there are only two things 
in question in this trial. .. So the two issues you really get to decide is 
whether the Defendant possessed that meth, and whether she knew or 
should have known that what was in that baggie was methamphetarnine. 
(12/11/13 Trial Tr., p.24, Ls.5-14 (emphasis added).) 
The prosecutor thus argued an incorrect legal standard. It is prosecutorial 
misconduct for a prosecutor to misstate the law in closing arguments. State v. Phillips, 
144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007). The Idaho Supreme Court has previously ordered a 
new trial in a similar case where the jury relied upon an erroneous "knew or should have 
known" standard to establish the defendant's knowledge. See State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 
237, 240-241 (1999). 
In State v. Blake, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court erred in 
giving jury instructions which stated that in order to find the defendant guilty of 
possession of a controlled substance the State must prove that he "knew or should 
have known" that the substance possessed was a controlled substance. 133 Idaho 
237, 240-241 (1999). The Supreme Court held that this was error, as it allowed the jury 
to convict the defendant using a negligence standard. Id. at 241. The Idaho Supreme 
' 
Court vacated the defendant's conviction and remanded the case with instructions for a 
new trial. Id. at 243. 
1 There the Court was specifically discussing cases in which the defendant mistakenly 
believed he was in possession of a different, but still illegal, controlled substance. 
Stefani, 142 Idaho at 704. Such is not the case here. 
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Here, the prosecutor's remarks asked the jury to apply the incorrect legal 
standard to establish the element of knowledge and thereby lowered the State's burden 
of proof. The jury was left with the impression that it could convict Ms. Gabel even if it 
found that she did not realize there was a controlled substance inside the baggie, but 
"should have known" what was in the baggie. 
The prosecutorial misconduct in Ms. Gabel's case rises to the level of 
fundamental error. The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the standard of appellate 
review of unobjected-to error. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). Pursuant to 
Perry, a defendant must demonstrate that: 1) one or more of his unwaived 
constitutional rights were violated; 2) there was a clear and obvious error without the 
need for additional information not contained in the appellate record; and 3) the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning that there is a reasonable 
probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. at 226. 
Ms. Gabel meets all the prongs of this test. 
First, the alleged error is a violation of Ms. Gabel's right to due process and a fair 
trial. Ms. Gabel was charged with possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine. {R., pp.24-25.) The general elements instruction told the jury that 
"[i]n order for the defendant to be guilty of Possession of a Controlled Substance, the 
state must prove each of the following: . . . the defendant either knew it was 
methamphetamine or believed it was a controlled substance," (Jury Instruction No. 11, 
attached to the Motion to Augment filed on December 19, 2014), but the prosecutor, in 
her closing remarks, incorrectly told the jury that it was required to prove only that 
Ms. Gabel "knew or should have known" that the baggie contained methamphetamine, 
thus removing the State's burden to prove that Ms. Gabel actually knew it was 
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niethamphetamine or believed it was a controlled substance (12/11/13 Trial Tr., p.24, 
Ls.'i 3-14 ). Because this misleading explanation of a key element of the crime was 
given to the jury, Ms. Gabel's right to a fair trial and due process v1ere violated. 
In In re l/1/inship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the United States Supreme Court stated: 
"Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt 
standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged." Id. at 364 (emphasis added). Thus, 
when a defendant charged with a crime pleads not guilty and takes his or her case to 
trial, the defendant is exercising his or her rights to due process of law and to a jury trial, 
requiring the State to prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged, to a 
jury, beyond a reasonable doubt. See U.S. Const. amds V, VI, XIV; see also Winship, 
397 U.S. at 364; Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485-86 (1978); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 
508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993). 
"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law 
as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including 
reasonable inferences from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth 
Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. The prosecutor's statement 
misinformed the jury as to the State's burden of proof as to Ms. Gabel's knowledge, 
which was a violation of Ms. Gabel's right to due process. See also State v. Beebe, 
145 Idaho 570 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level of a 
fundamental error where the prosecutor misstated the evidence, misstated the law, and 
appealed to the passions and prejudice of the jury). 
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Thus the jurors could reasonably have concluded that they were directed to find 
Ms. Gabel guilty of possession of a controlled substance without finding that she knew 
what was in the bag. Such an interpretation would have deprived Ms. Gabel of her right 
to the due process of law and her right to a fair trial; thus, the erroneous explanation of 
the elements in this case was unconstitutional. Thus, the error implicates one of 
Ms. Gabel's unwaived constitutional rights. 
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record. These fair trial and due 
process violations are apparent from the face of the record and are clear violations of 
well-established law. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364; see also Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 
U.S. 478, 485-86 (1978); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 ('1993). The 
closing statements of the prosecutor are in the record, so there is no need for additional 
information outside the record. Further, there could be no strategic advantage to 
defense counsel allowing the prosecutor to lower the State's burden of proof by 
misleading the jury as to whether Ms. Gabel was required to know what was in the bag. 
Third, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings. While the jury did receive an instruction properly setting forth the general 
elements of possession of a controlled substance (Jury Instruction No. 11, attached to 
the Motion to Augment filed on December 19, 2014; 12/11/13 Trial Tr., p.17, Ls.13-25), 
the prosecutor misinformed the jury as to what knowledge Ms. Gabel must have to be 
guilty of the offense. ( 12/11 /13 Trial Tr., p.24, Ls.11-14.) Because of the error, the jury 
was left with the impression that it could convict Ms. Gabel even if it found that she did 
not know what was in the bag. Further, the first trial, at which the prosecutor did not 
give an erroneous elements explanation and which resulted in a hung jury, 
demonstrated that there had been question in the minds of the previous jury as to 
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whether Ms. Gabel was guilty of the offense. (11/13/13 Trial Tr., p.13, L.6- p.18, L.21, 
p.34, L.14 - p.35, L.3.) Had this jury been properly instructed and not mislead by the 
prosecutor's statements, it is likely this jury would have also been unable to convict 
Ms. Gabel of the offense. 
It was apparent from the prosecutor's misstatement of the law that the jury could 
convict Ms. Gabel based on an improper standard of knowledge. Where the jury was 
instructed that it could find Ms. Gabel guilty based on a negligence standard, this 
removed the burden on the State to prove that Ms. Gabel knew or believed the 
substance in question to be a controlled substance. 
Because the prosecutor's explanation of the element of possession violated 
Ms. Gabel's right to due process and a fair trial, and because she meets all three 
prongs of Idaho's fundamental error test, Ms. Gabel's conviction must be vacated. 
B. It Was Misconduct For The Prosecutor To Offer Her Opinion Concerning 
Ms. Gabel's Purported Lack Of Truthfulness And/Or Her Guilt Of The Charged 
Offense 
It was misconduct for the prosecution to give her opinion regarding Ms. Gabel's 
veracity. Such was an improper attempt to influence the jury using the weight of her 
office which constituted prosecutorial misconduct. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "in all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Fourteenth Amendment states, 
"[n]o state shall. .. deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Additionally, the Idaho Constitution guarantees 
that, "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law." ID. CONST. art. I, § 13. Due process requires criminal trials be fundamentally fair. 
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Schwartzmil!er v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial misconduct may so 
unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process. State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005); Greer v. Miller, 483 
U.S. 756, 765 (1987). In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial 
misconduct must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the defendant's 
right to a fair trial. Id. The hallmark of due process analysis in cases of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. 
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). The aim of due process is not the 
punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial 
to the accused. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[e]very person accused of crime in 
Idaho has the right to a fair and impartial trial." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 504 
(1980). Further, the prosecutor has an independent duty to the defendant with regard to 
his or her right to a fair trial. In the words of the Court: 
We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant 
has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to 
the jury." They should not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far 
they can trespass upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing 
they transgress upon the rights of the accused." 
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007) (internal citations omitted). The Idaho 
Court of Appeals has held: 
Closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution 
by the trier of fact in a criminal case. Its purpose is to enlighten the jury 
and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence. Both sides 
have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument 
to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective 
standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. 
State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 369 (Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted). 
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However, closing argument should not include the prosecutor's personal opinions 
and beliefs about the credibility of a witness or inflammatory words employed in 
describing the defendant. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86; see State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 
160, 169 (Ct. App. "1999) (holding that "it is improper for a prosecutor to express a 
personal belief or opinion regarding the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or 
as to the guilt of the defendant"); see also State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, "111 (1979) 
{holding that it was error for the prosecutor to express a personal belief or opinion as to 
the truth or falsity of the defendant's testimony, but in light of the overwhelming and 
conclusive evidence against the defendant, the error was harmless).2 
With respect to due process, the United States Supreme Court has explained 
why the prosecutor cannot vouch for a witness's credibility or express a personal 
opinion of the defendant's guilt, stating: 
The prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing 
his personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two 
dangers: such comments can convey the impression that evidence not 
presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges 
against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant's right to be 
tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and the 
prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and 
may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its 
own view of the evidence. 
Carson, 151 Idaho at 721 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985)). 
Here, the prosecutor asked the jury to make a decision based upon her opinion 
that Ms. Gabel was untruthful. The prosecutor's statements went much further than the 
permissible bounds allowed to encourage a jury to question the credibility of witnesses. 
2 Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4 provides, "A lawyer shall not ... in trial ... state 
a personal opinion as to ... the credibility of a witness ... or the guilt or innocence of an 
accused." The rule applies to both the prosecuting attorney and to defense counsel. 
State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 721 (2011 ). 
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The prosecutor told the jury that, in her opinion, Ms. Gabel had a motive to be 
untruthful: 
She tells the officer that she doesn't [know what was in the baggie]. She 
says oh, what's that, what's that? So then we have to ask, was she being 
truthful when she said oh, what's that? I don't know what it is. Would she 
have a motive to not be truthful at that point? / think so. 
(12/1 ·1/13 Trial Tr., p.25, L.22 - p.26, L2 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor then 
correctly told tl1e jury it was up to them to determine credibility, but immediately 
thereafter again stated that she did not believe Ms. Gabel's version of the events: 
Now, the defense is going to tell you that everything that she said after 
that was a product of that untruth, that she was just mimicking the officer. 
She was just saying what he said. And if she had said, yeah, you're right, 
and left it at that, / could maybe buy that. But she didn't. 
(12/11/13 Trial Tr., p.27, Ls.15-2·1 (emphasis added).) Ms. Gabel asserts that the 
prosecution made impermissible statements inserting her personal view of the 
evidence, including repeatedly offering her opinion that Ms. Gabel was not telling the 
truth. 
It is a violation of Ms. Gabel's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial 
to have a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial 
and the law as explained in the jury instructions. In this case, misconduct related to the 
prosecution expressing opinions regarding Ms. Gabel's credibility interfered with the 
jury's ability to make an impartial decision, thereby interfering with Ms. Gabel's Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury. As such, the misconduct in this case clearly 
violates her unwaived constitutional rights and deprived her of her right to a fair trial. As 
such, this Court must vacate the conviction. 
The prosecutorial misconduct violated Ms. Gabel's fundamental rights and meets 
the test set forth in Perry, as discussed in section A. First, it is a violation of Ms. Gabel's 
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Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial to have a jury reach its decision on 
any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial and the law as explained in the jury 
instructions. It should be noted that the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Perry that, 
"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set 
forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth 
Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. This is an implicit recognition 
by the Idaho Supreme Court that prosecutorial misconduct claims may be connected to 
a constitutional provision. 
The misconduct in this case not only involved Ms. Gabel's state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process, but also her federal and state constitutional rights to 
a jury trial. As such, the errors involve an unwaived constitutional right and are 
reviewable for fundamental error. The error in this case plainly exists from the record 
and no additional information is necessary. The record in this case suggests no reason 
to conclude that defense counsel elected, as a matter of trial strategy, to waive any 
objection when the prosecution disparaged the veracity of Ms. Gabel. Further, it cannot 
be a tactical decision on the part of the defense to have a jury reach a verdict, not 
based on the evidence and law, but based on impermissible grounds presented through 
misconduct. As such, the first two prongs of the Perry test are satisfied. 
The final question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the 
prosecutor's misconduct affected the outcome of Ms. Gabel's trial. Ms. Gabel contends 
that there is. The prosecutor's comments on Ms. Gabel's veracity and thus her guilt or 
innocence impermissibly usurped the jury's role as the factfinder and further, because 
the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government, it may have 
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induced the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the 
evidence. As such, the State's misconduct was extraordinarily prejudicial and, 
therefore, satisfies the third prong of the Perry test. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Gabel respectfully requests that this Court vacate her Judgment of 
Conviction and remand her case for a new trial. 
DATED this 19th day of December, 2014. 
SALLY;J. COOLEY · 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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